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This paper analyzes the effect of unions on the duration of non-work spells of claimants in 
the workers’ compensation insurance system.  It has been argued that a union may affect the 
duration of non-work spells in two ways.  First, a union may alter the true level of workplace 
safety and in turn affect both the frequency and severity of work-related injuries (‘true safety’ 
effect).  Second, a union may influence workers’ incentives to file claims or stay in the 
system for the longer non-work spell (‘claims-reporting moral hazard’ effect).  This study 
analyzes 9,818 workers’ compensation claims filed with the Minnesota Department of Labor 
and Industry for injuries that occurred in 1993 and 1994 in 873 sample firms included in the 
Minnesota Human Resource Management Practice (MHRMP) Survey. To correct for the 
right-censoring data problem, we use a maximum likelihood estimate of duration of non-
work spells using the Weibull distribution.  Empirical results show that being a union 
member is associated with a 19% increase in the duration of non-work spells.  This means 
that on average, the non-work spells are approximately ten days longer for workers from 
unionized firms as compared to their non-unionized counterparts in the sample of this study. 
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  The purpose of this paper is to analyze what role unions play in affecting the duration 
of non-work spells in the workers’ compensation system.  In particular, this study focuses on 
the temporary total indemnity claims, where workers are temporarily forced to be out of work 
due to total physical impairment on the job
1. Temporary total indemnity claims account for 
about 70 percent of all workers’ compensation claims (Minnesota Department of Labor and 
Industry, 1995).   
  The duration of non-work spells in the workers’ compensation system depends on 
both the severity of the impairment and the worker’s incentives, for example introduced by 
the availability of disability benefits, to return to work.  The presence of a union in the 
workplace may have effects on the duration of non-work spells in workers’ compensation 
system in two ways.  First, a union may alter the true level of workplace safety and in turn 
affect both the frequency and severity of work related injuries (i.e., ‘true safety’ effect), and 
second, a union may influence workers’ incentives to file claims or stay in the system for a 
longer period of non-work spell (i.e., ‘moral hazard’ effect).  
 
Literature Review and Hypotheses 
  In general, earlier studies analyzing non-work spells in the workers’ compensation 
system find that higher benefits, lower wages, older age, and attorney involvement are 
associated with longer claim duration (i.e., less successful return-to-work outcomes).   
Evidence on the impact of unions on returns to work comes primarily from US studies using 
samples of temporary total disability claims.  These studies find the longer work absences 
among unionized workers (Butler and Worrall, 1985, 1993; Johnson and Ondrich, 1990).  
Claim frequency also increases with union membership both in analyses using aggregate US Ben-Ner and Park, Union and Worker’s Compensation Insurance System 
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data (Butler and Worrall, 1983) and in disaggregated micro-data sets (Kruger, 1990; Hirsch, 
MacPherson and Dumon, 1996).  Hirsch et al. (1996) conducted a study of claim recipiency 
using a union dummy variable among US workers using Current Population Survey data 
from 1977-1992.  Their empirical results show that union members are much more likely to 
receive workers’ compensation benefits than nonunion members with similar characteristics 
employed in similar jobs, and that union members are more sensitive to variations in benefits 
levels and waiting periods than nonunion members.  Particularly, they argue that ‘moral 
hazard’ may be a more seious problem in unionized firms where management has less 
discretion and ability to monitor and penalize workers for questionable claims.   
  However, studies based on industry-level data may suffer from aggregation-bias 
problem, whereas studies using micro-data have analyzed only the incidence of the individual 
claims but not claim duration. Furthermore, union workers are more likely than nonunion 
workers to be in jobs with dangerous or unpleasant working conditions (Duncan and Stafford, 
1980; Leigh, 1982; Worrall and Butler, 1983).  Most previous studies focused on the 
industry-level analyses fail to control such industry or occupation variables to estimate the 
independent effect of union on safety outcome of the workplace.   
 
The ‘true safety’ effect  
The first way in which the presence of a union in the workplace may affect the 
duration of a workers’ compensation claim through the ‘true safety’ effect: a union may alter 
workplaces safety conditions, and the incidence and severity of injuries will change, thus 
affecting the durations of workers’ compensation indemnity claims.   
  How do unions affect workplace safety?  The literature focuses mainly on unions’ 
effects on compensating payments for hazardous work, generally finding that unionized firms 
maintain greater compensation for job hazards than nonunion settings (Thaler and Rosen, Ben-Ner and Park, Union and Worker’s Compensation Insurance System 
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1975; Viscusi, 1979,1980; Olson, 1981; Dickens, 1984; Fairris, 1992).  The greater 
compensating-wage differential as a risk premium in unionized settings is due to improved 
information about workplace safety available to employees in the course of collective 
bargaining.  An increase in the risk premium, in turn, will provide an incentive to firms to 
increase their investment in safety inputs because the marginal benefit of such an investment 
is,  ceteris paribus, increased.  Hence a union is expected to enhance workplace safety, 
unionized workers will experience less serious injuries, and therefore their injury-related 
non-work spells will be shorter than those of their non-unionized counterparts. 
  In addition, unions may provide a mechanism for workers to participate in decisions 
regarding the work environment, thereby increasing workers’ level of job satisfaction.   
Workers who are more satisfied with their jobs use the disability system less often and for 
shorter spells of non-work than less satisfied workers (Robinson, 1988).  In sum, based on the 
‘true safety’ effect, we hypothesize that the presence of a union in the workplace will be 
associated with the shorter duration of non-work spells in the workers’ compesation system. 
 
The ‘moral hazard’ effect 
Contrary to the ‘true safety’ effect, there are two reasons for expecting a positive 
association between union status and the duration of non-work spells in the workers’ 
compensation system: 1) ‘moral hazard’ behavior on the claimant’s (employee’s) side, and 2) 
‘moral hazard’ problem on the firm’s side in the unionized workplace.  Most important is the 
independent role of union voice in workplace governance (Freeman and Medoff, 1984), 
which may have two types of effects, both positive, on claim duration.   
  First, in the event of an injury, workers already who are not aware of the availability 
of workers’ compensation benefits are quickly informed by co-workers, shop stewards, or 
supervisors.  That is, unions encourage their members to file claims, or to continue to Ben-Ner and Park, Union and Worker’s Compensation Insurance System 
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maintain claimant status once a claim has begun by providing information and forms related 
to the workers’ compensation system, and by providing legal counsel should problems arise 
in the claims process.  The effect of such activities is to reduce discrepancies between true 
injuries and actual claims, discrepancies that could result from actions (or inactions) by firms 
interested in lowering the cost of claims. 
  Second, the behavior of workers in unionized workplaces may too be affected by 
reduced ‘moral hazard’ problem on the firm’s side, if management has less discretion and 
ability to monitor and penalize workers for questionable claims. Managers are not likely to 
discourage legitimate claims for workers’ compensation, since such actions would be known 
to the union and could provoke the filing of a grievance.  Unions could reduce firm’s moral-
hazard problem, and thus increase claim duration.  Individual workers are less likely to be 
penalized in the event that they file a false workers’ compensation claim or stay longer period 
of non-work spells, due to union support.  Hence claim duration will be, ceteris paribus, 
longer in unionized firms.  
  In sum, the ‘true safety’ and ‘moral hazard’ effects of unions on workers’ 
compensation recipiency have opposite signs and the overall effect is therefore theoretically 
indeterminate and remains as an empirical question. 
 
Data and Methodology 
 
This study analyzes 9,818 workers’ compensation claims filed with the Minnesota 
Department of Labor and Industry (DLI) for those injuries occurred in 1993 and 1994, which 
are matched against 873 sample firms of Minnesota Human Resource Management Practice 
(MHRMP) Survey data
2.
  The Minnesota DLI’s database has been constructed from ‘first 
reports’ of injuries filed in 1993 and 1994.  The first report forms classify injury claims by Ben-Ner and Park, Union and Worker’s Compensation Insurance System 
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type of injury such as strain and laceration, and body part such as back and neck.  Also, 
employee characteristics such as age, gender, and occupation, and employer’s major industry 
and size are all available from this form.  Information about union membership of the 
claimant employee comes from the MHRMP Survey. 
  We analyze the effect of union membership on the claim duration of workers’ 
compensation temporary total indemnity cases controlling for wage, benefits, age, gender, 
attorney involvement, injury type, occupation, and industry.  However, approximately 12 
percent of observations consists of individual claimants who continue non-work spells with 
concomitant receipt of workers’ compensation benefits.  These continuing-status recipients, 
who have not yet completed their tenure on workers’ compensation, are said to be right 
censored. 
 Right-censored  observations  represent  a problem for the ordinary log-duration 
regression model, which is the procedure used in these sort of situations.  If one excludes 
censored observations, one may be losing valuable information about the sample distribution, 
particularly since these observations may be right censored because they are the claims of 
those who have longer non-work spells; hence, discarding these observations is likely to 
result in a nonrepresentative sample, and could bias the results.  On the other hand, including 
censored observations and applying ordinary-least-square regression techniques may result in 
biased estimates as a result of treating censored observations (incomplete spells) on the same 
basis as other observations (complete spells).   
  What one needs is a regression technique that controls for right censoring.  We chose 
to use maximum likelihood estimate of duration using the Weibull distribution, and the 
following equation expresses the time that workers spend off work after the injury: 
 
    l n   ( T i) = α 0 + β Ui + γ Xi + ε i  




     i  : individual claimant 
      T : spell of time from the day of the injury until the day of return to 
        w o r k  
      U : union membership status of the i th claimant 
      X : individual, firm, injury, and pecuniary characteristics of  
     c l a i m a n t   i 
   ε :  independent random disturbance, such that T is Weibull distributed  
 
  The control variables vector X includes claimant characteristics (age, gender, wage, 
occupation, and nature of injury), employment size of the claimant’s company, and primary 
industry of the company.  While control variables are added into the model in order to 
estimate the independent effect of union on the dependent variable, the industry and 
occupation dummy variables are of particular importance in that they may control for the 





In the sample of this study, 53 percent of total claims are filed by employees from 
unionized firms.  This relatively large proportion is due to the fact that the larger companies 
in the sample are more likely to be unionized.  About 18 percent of 873 sample firms are 
unionized.  About 59 percent of the claimants in the sample are male and 34 percent of the 
total claims in the sample are back-related injuries.  Manufacturing and wholesale/retail firms 
accounted for about 59 percent of the entire sample.  Table 1 summarizes the definition and 
sample descriptive statistics of the variables included in the study.  
  Empirical results of this study show that the presence of an union in the workplace 
affects claimants’ non-work spells in a statistically significant and positive manner.   
Employees from unionized workplaces showed significantly longer duration of off-work Ben-Ner and Park, Union and Worker’s Compensation Insurance System 
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spells.  In all specifications being a union member was associated with 19 percent increase in 
the duration of non-work spells.  Considering that the mean duration of non-work spells in 
the sample is 52 days, this means that, on average, workers from unionized firms had about 
10 days longer duration of non-work spells as compared to their non-unionized counterparts.  
Table 2 summarizes the results of Weibull estimates of the duration of non-work spells using 
the LIFEREG procedure in Statistical Analysis System (SAS). 
  The union impact on the duration of non-work spells was hypothesized to have two 
opposing effects.  First, the union was hypothesized to facilitate moral hazard behavior on the 
claimant’s side as well as to produce firm moral hazard behavior, both tending to increase 
non-work spells.  And since unionized workplaces are apparently more hazardous compared 
to their non-unionized counterparts, injuries may be more severe, leading to longer non-work 
spells. 
  Second, unions were hypothesized to improve safety, and therefore shorten the non-
work spells.  However, even after controlling for industry and occupation variables, the 
effects of the union on the duration of non-work spells is still positive and significant, which 
suggests that the union impact is due mainly to the moral hazard behavior.  Whether the 
effect is due mainly to more false claims, or fewer inappropriate denials by firm, remains an 
open question. 
  Some control variables showed statistically significant coefficients in all 
specifications. Several of these may be interpreted in terms of opportunity costs of being 
away from work, which affect the claimant’s incentive to stay in the system by not returning 
to work.  Female workers (MALE) are shown to have longer duration of non-work spells, 
which suggests that the opportunity cost of not being at work may be less than that of male 
workers.  It may be argued that male workers are more likely to be a bread-winner of the 
family and more likely to be a major source of the family income. The wage replacement rate Ben-Ner and Park, Union and Worker’s Compensation Insurance System 
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(LnRRATE) in the workers’ compensation system also suggests the incentive effects due to 
the different levels of opportunity costs of staying away from work.  It is obvious that a 
higher level of replacement rate will be associated with a lower cost of being away from 
work.  Empirical results support this argument.    Self-insured employers (SELF) may 
have greater financial incentive to monitor the high-cost claims and in turn will be negatively 
associated with the duration of non-work spells in the workers’ compensation system.   
Empirical results indeed showed a negative effect of SELF but without the statistical 
significance.  Older workers (LnAGE) wait longer before returning back to work, once they 
are injured.  It is not surprising to note this result because older workers are more prone to 
more serious injuries and may take more time before they are fully recovered from the injury 
as compared to relatively younger workers.   
  Employment size (SIZE) is negatively associated with the length of time from injury 
to return-to-work.  It could be argued that larger firms facilitate their injured workers’ return-
to- work through greater investment in various rehabilitation programs, and providing less 
strenuous jobs to returning workers.  Larger firms may have greater incentives to promote 
such return-to-work programs because they are more likely to be experience-rated in the 
workers’ compensation system, and therefore have an incentive in improving the safety of 
their workplaces.  As noted earlier, a safer workplace is likely to be associated with less 
severe injuries, and thus shorter spells of non-work time. 
    
Conclusion 
 
  The purpose of this study is to empirically test the impact of the presence of a union 
in a workplace on the duration of non-work spell in the workers’ compensation system.   
Matched micro-level data between Minnesota Department of Labor and Industry’s   Ben-Ner and Park, Union and Worker’s Compensation Insurance System 
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administrative data base and the Minnesota Human Resource Management Practices Survey 
data for the period of 1993 and 1994 were analyzed.  Results from estimating the Weibull 
duration model suggest that the presence of a union in the workplace significantly lengthens 
the duration of the claimant’s staying off work. 
  In all empirical specifications, being a union member was associated with a 19 
percent increase in the duration of non-work spells.  Considering that the mean duration of 
non-work spells in the sample is 52 days, this means that, on average, workers from 
unionized firms had about 10 days longer duration of non-work spells as compared to their 
non-unionized counterparts. 
  We had two hypotheses concerning the possible impact of unionism on the duration 
of non-work spells in a positive manner.  A union may support employees who seek to stay 
longer off work after an injury - an employee-side moral hazard issue.  A union may also 
oppose management pressure for early return of an injured employee - such pressure is an 
employer-side moral hazard issue.  Both tend to increase non-work spells.  And since 
unionized workplaces are apparently more hazardous compared to their non-unionized 
counterparts, injuries may be more severe, also leading to longer non-work spells.  However, 
even after controlling for industry and occupation variables, the effects of the union on the 
duration of non-work spells is still positive and significant, which suggests that the union 
impact is due mainly to the moral hazard behavior. However, whether the union effect on 
non-work spell duration is due mainly to more false claims (employee-side moral hazard), or 
fewer inappropriate denials by firms (employer-side moral hazard), remains an open 
question.  This would be a possible challenging research question in the future study in this 
area, despite the difficulty of being able to actually screen out a claimant’s moral hazard 
behavior in filing fraudulent claims in the workers’ compensation system
3.   Ben-Ner and Park, Union and Worker’s Compensation Insurance System 
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 Table 1.   
Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics: Matched Sample of MHRMP Survey Data 




Mean St.  Dev. 
 
Dependent Variable 
NWSPELL  Duration of non-work spell: days of temporary total disability 





UNION  A dummy variable coded 1 if the claimant filed a workers’ 
compensation claim in an unionized firm, 0 otherwise 
0.53 0.50 
MALE  A dummy variable coded 1 if the claimant is male, and 0 otherwise  0.59  0.49 
LnAGE  Log of age of the claimant at the time of injury  3.60  0.32 





Type of Injury 
FRACTR  Dummy variable coded 1 for fractures, 0 otherwise  0.03  0.16 
BKSTR  Dummy variable coded 1 for back strains or sprains, 0 otherwise  0.18  0.38 
OTHSTR  Dummy variable coded 1 for strains or sprains involving other body 
parts than back, 0 otherwise 
0.16 0.37 
CONTUS  Dummy variable coded 1 for contusions or concussions, 0 otherwise  0.05  0.21 
CUT  Dummy variable coded 1 for cuts and lacerations, 0 otherwise  0.07  0.25 
ALLOTR  Dummy variable coded 1 for all other types of injuries, 0 otherwise  0.51  0.50 
 
Occupation of the Claimant 
OCC1  Dummy variable coded 1 for the occupational group of service, 0 
otherwise 
0.12 0.33 
OCC2  Dummy variable coded 1 for the occupational group of laborers, 0 
otherwise 
0.15 0.36 
OCC3  Dummy variable coded 1 for the occupational group of crafts, 0 
otherwise 
0.16 0.37 
OCC4  Dummy variable coded 1 for the occupational group of professional, 
managerial, sales, and technicians, 0 otherwise 
0.20 0.40 
OCC5  Dummy variable coded 1 for the occupational group of operators, 0 
otherwise 
0.27 0.45 
OCC6  Dummy variable coded 1 for the occupational group of 
transportation, 0 otherwise 
0.04 0.19 
OCC7  Dummy variable coded 1 for the occupational group of clerical, 0 
otherwise 
0.08 0.28 
OCC8  Dummy variable coded 1 for the occupational group of farm and 
others, 0 otherwise 
 
0.01 0.04 
Y94  Dummy variable coded 1 if the injury occurred in 1994, 0 otherwise  0.54  0.50 Ben-Ner and Park, Union and Worker’s Compensation Insurance System 
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(Table 1 Continued) 
 
Firm Characteristics 
SIZE1  Dummy variable coded 1 if firm size is 1-50 employees, 0 otherwise  0.07  0.26 
SIZE2  Dummy variable coded 1 if firm size is 51-100 employees, 0 
otherwise 
0.07 0.26 
SIZE3  Dummy variable coded 1 if firm size is 101-500 employees, 0 
otherwise 
0.35 0.48 
SIZE4  Dummy variable coded 1 if firm size is 501-1,000 employees, 0 
otherwise 
0.12 0.33 






SIC1  Dummy variable coded 1 if the firm’s major industry is mining or 
construction, 0 otherwise 
0.04 0.19 
SIC2  Dummy variable coded 1 if the firm’s major industry is durable or 
non-durable manufacturing (lumber, furniture, food, tobacco, 
textile, apparel, paper, printing, chemical, petroleum, rubber, etc.), 
0 otherwise 
0.19 0.39 
SIC3  Dummy variable coded 1 if the firm’s major industry is durable or 
non-durable manufacturing (metal, industrial machinery, 
equipment, etc.), 0 otherwise 
0.36 0.48 
SIC4  Dummy variable coded 1 if the firm’s major industry is 
transportation, 0 otherwise 
0.04 0.19 
SIC5  Dummy variable coded 1 if the firm’s major industry is whole-
sale/retail, 0 otherwise 
0.23 0.42 
SIC6  Dummy variable coded 1 if the firm’s major industry is finance, 
insurance, or real estate, 0 otherwise 
 
0.05 0.22 
SIC7  Dummy variable coded 1 if the firm’s major industry is service, 0 
otherwise 
0.04 0.20 
SIC8  Dummy variable coded 1 if the firm’s major industry is health, legal, 
education, social, or engineering services, 0 otherwise 
0.05 0.22 
      
 
1.  The dependent variable NWSPELL is transformed into logarithmic form in the LIFEREG function of SAS.   
2.  Real wage replacement rate was used to capture both wage and expected workers’ compensation benefit 
effects on the dependent variable.  In accordance with the Minnesota Workers’ Compensation law, RRATE 
was calculated by the following formula (Minnesota WC income benefit schedule used; 1992 Analysis of 
Workers’ Compensation Laws, US Chamber of Commerce) 
  
 RRATE  =  MAXt / Wage  if (Wage× 0.66) >= MAXt 
     0.66   if  [MINt <= (Wage× 0.66) < MAXt] 
     MINt /Wage  if [(MINt *0.66) <= (Wage× 0.66) < MINt] 
     1  otherwise, 
 
    where  Wage   = average production employee’s gross weekly wage 
  MAXt = Maximum amount of wage replacement through Minnesota workers’ compensation 
        system, which was $428.00 and $443.00 in 1993 and 1994, respectively 
  MINt = Maximum amount of wage replacement through Minnesota workers’ compensation 
        system which was $214.00 and $221.50 in 1993 and 1994, respectively Ben-Ner and Park, Union and Worker’s Compensation Insurance System 
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                                Table 2.  Weibull Estimate of the Duration of Non-Work Spells 
in the Workers’ Compensation System : Minnesota 1993-1994 
(Standard Error in Parentheses) 
 
  Dependent Variable : Log of Non-Work Spell in 
 the Minnesota Workers Compensation System 





















































































Industry Dummies  yes  yes  yes 
Injury Type Dummies  no  no  yes 
Occupation Dummies  no  yes  yes 
      
Log Likelihood for WEIBULL  -6724.27  -6742.77  -6718.79 
n 3994  3994  3994 
      
* Statistically significant at the 0.1 significance level; ** at the 0.05 significance level; *** at the 0.01 
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1 There are four main types of indemnity benefits in workers’ compensation insurance.   
First, ‘temporary total’ benefits are paid to workers who are totally unable to work for a finite 
period of time.  Second, workers who have returned to work after the injury with a wage loss, 
receive indemnity benefits known as temporary partial benefits.  Typically two-thirds of the 
difference between current gross wages and gross wages at time of the injury, with the yearly 
inflation adjustment beginning two years after injury, are paid.  Third, if a worker remains 
totally disabled after reaching the point of maximum medical improvement, he or she is 
eligible for permanent total benefits.  Fourth, workers who suffer a disability that is partially 
disabling but is expected to last indefinitely qualify for permanent partial benefits.  An 
employee who lost the use of a limb, for example, would receive permanent partial benefits. 
 
2  The Minnesota Human Resource Management Practices (MHRMP) Survey has been 
conducted in 1994 and 1996.  The sample firms are size-and industry-stratified.  The survey 
questionnaire asked for detailed information on various aspects of firm’s human resource 
management practices including firm’s history of maintenance of employee participation 
plans in decision-making (e.g., teams, quality circle, total quality management, etc.) and 
employee participation plans in financial returns (e.g., employee stock ownership plan, gain-
sharing plan, etc.), as well as basic firm characteristics such as employee characteristics (e.g., 
tenure, age, education, etc.), task attributes of core employees, and unionization of the 
workplace.  For more information on MHRMP Survey see Park (1997). 
 
3 For notable studies which attempted to measure the claimants moral hazard behavior in the 
workers compensation system, refer to Card and McCall (1996) and Park and Butler (2001). 